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The Court of Justice of EU has established very early in its history direct vertical 
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1. PROBLEM
The direct vertical effect of Treaty provisions on free movement of goods has 
been established by activist interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union (CJEU) very early in the history of EU Law. Famous judgement 
in the landmark 1963 Van Gend en Loos1 case introduced the principle of 
direct effect.  This judge-made principle forms essential, almost sacrosanct, 
element of genesis narrative in every conventional introductory EU Law co-
urse. Although Treaty provisions on free movement of goods encompass pro-
hibition of customs duties on imports/exports (including charges having equi-
valent effect)2 between Member States and prohibition of tax discrimination3 
main regulatory impetus in market-building process was, so far at least4, to 
be found in the fi eld of quotas. More formally put, it was based in prohibition 
of quantitative restrictions on imports and exports and all measures having 
equivalent effect contained in Articles 345 and 356 of the TFEU. In the words 
of W.P.J.Wils aforementioned prohibition became the tool for policing the bor-
derline between legitimate and illegitimate national regulation7. While ver-
tical direct effect of Articles 34 and 35 became non-contentiously established 
doctrine and one of the corner-stones of the EU Law, direct horizontal effect 
of this same rules has never been recognized. Why? 
Most simplistic and obvious answer is that Court wanted to limit the regu-
latory scope of these provisions. Transversal of rights to individuals, natural 
and legal persons, was intended via principle of direct effect only to protect 
them from Member States interventions in the internal market (exclusively in 
situations with actual or potential cross border effect)8. In the words of Norbert 
1  Case 26/62  NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Ned-
erlandse Administratis der Belastingen, EU:C:1963:1
2  Article 30 TFEU
3  Article 110 TFEU
4  Recently the Court of Justice of the EU in the fi eld of free movement of goods experienced 
infl ux off tax discrimination cases.
5  Article 34 of the TFEU (Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having 
equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States).
6  Article 35 of the TFEU (Quantitative restrictions on exports, and all measures having 
equivalent effect, shall be prohibited between Member States).
7  Wils, W.P.J., The Search for the Rule in Article 30 EEC: Much Ado About Nothing?,Euro-
pean Law Review 18,1993, p 478.
8  Problem of absence of direct horizontal effect in Treaty provisions on free movement of 
goods is of such magnitude that the Court of Justice extend obligation of harmonious inter-
pretation (or indirect effect), fi rst developed in the case law on the effect of Directives  (Von 
Colson and Kamman – Marleasing - Kolpinghuis Nijmegen-Pupino line of jurisprudence), to 
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Reich EU Law is not a panacea against every state regulation which restricts 
competition9. Thus free movement of goods is not designed to be a source 
of independent constitutional fundamental right, something like an economic 
due process clause, but only a freedom from the Member State intervention. 
Following that interpretation distinction between vertical and horizontal di-
rect effect of Articles 34 and 35 becomes demarcation between constitutional 
fundamental right on one side and a freedom from the State intervention (in 
cross-border situations) on the other side. It is not very hard to conclude from 
such reading that hypothetical change in the recognition of horizontal direct 
effect of free movement of goods would signal shift in the EU Law and nature 
of integration process in general.   
2.  MODELS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION: NEW 
HORIZONS 
Former Advocate General Maduro in his reward wining research10 on the 
application of Article 34 of the Treaty (at that time Article 30),  develops diffe-
rent models of European Economic Constitution: judicial, centralised,  com-
petitive and decentralised model. Constitutional models are results of different 
intrinsic tensions in the process of market integration. Basic idea behind this 
approach establishes a correlation between application of rules on free move-
ment of goods and building of the European Economic Constitution. Maduro 
borrows from theory of comparative institutional analysis developed by US 
scholar Neil Komesar11. Answer to the question of content of the European 
Economic Constitution can be found somewhere in dichotomy between bro-
ader economic liberalism and pure anti-protectionism. Maduro develops this 
dichotomy on the framework of discrimination tests, typological tests and ba-
lancing (cost/benefi t) tests for the application of Article 34. The Economic 
Article 34 TFEU.  In Spanish strawberries and Schmidberger cases France and Austria were 
held liable for not taking adequate steps to remove barriers to free movement of goods gener-
ated by private entities (protestors blocking the road traffi c). See case C-265/95 Commission v 
France , EU:C:1997:595 and case C-112/00 Schmidberger, EU:C:2003:333
9  Reich, N, Review article: Europe’s economic constitution, or: a new look at Keck, Oxford 
Journal Of Legal Studies, 19(2), 1999, p 343.
10  Maduro, L.M.P., We the Court - The European Court of Justice and the European Eco-
nomic Constitution, Oxford Hart Publishing, 1998
11  Komesar, Neil K., In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative 
Institutional Alternative, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 79, 1350, 1981 and Komesar, Neil K., 
Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1994
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Constitution has three building elements: EU, Member States and individuals 
(perceived as market citizens). 
Judicial model basically interprets approach taken by the European Court of 
Justice within framework of majoritarian activism. Majoritanian activism in 
the sense that Court of Justice , when acting as a market regulator, balances 
between various confronting interests and seeks a majoritanian interests aga-
inst minoritarian positions of some states or trades12. This forms ‘reasons 
behind reasoning’. Judicial regulation in the application of free movement of 
goods is primarily designed against national measures of Member States with 
cross-border effect, especially in areas lacking harmonization at EU level. It 
is not protection against any public intervention in the market. When majori-
tanian view is diffi cult to ascertain Court is no longer ready to strike down 
national measures13. 
Centralised model favours a process of market regulation by the replacement 
of national laws with EU legislation: national regulation incompatible with the 
aim of integrated market should be replace with harmonised legislation. This 
model lies upon two basic assumptions: fi rst, political control over the internal 
market is only possible at EU level, secondly, political control over the econo-
mic sphere is legitimate14. Centralised model requires setting up institutions at 
Union level responsible for harmonising legislation. Competitive model of the 
European Economic Constitution has its basis on a fully-fl edged application 
of free movement and competition rules15. These are intended to safeguard 
the market from public intervention and to promote competition among rules 
(regulatory competition) through the mutual recognition. Decentralised model 
can be summarised as a system in which States retain regulatory powers but 
are, at the same time, required not to discriminate against foreign produ-
cts or persons in the exercise of those powers16. For consumers decentralised 
model offers more choice but competitive model offers more protection. In a 
decentralised model main regulatory institutions will be the Member States 
themselves.
Maduro links competitive model with ordoliberalism (although he does not 
distinguish clearly ordoliberalism and neoliberalism). Ordoliberalism has 
its roots in Freiburg school of economic thought founded in 1930’s. It was 
was developed by German economists and legal scholars like Walter Eucken, 
12 Supra note 9, pp. 339
13  Supra note 10, pp. 73
14  Ibid, pp. 111
15  Ibid, pp. 126
16  Ibid, pp. 143
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Franz Böhm and Hans Grossmann-Doerth. Ordoliberlas shared opposition to 
corporatist and oligopolistic economic policy of Nazi Germany which made 
them subject to moderate prosecution. Ordoliberal theory holds that the state 
must create neutral legal environment for the economy and maintain a high 
level of competition (ordungspolitik). Thus, ordoliberalism traditionally puts 
strong emphasize on competition rules. Unlike neoliberals orodliberals are not 
opposed a priori to the strong role of the State (or public authority). For them 
market principles are the source of legitimacy for regulatory intervention. It 
is not hard to see how in Maduro’s competitive model market freedoms are 
perceived as fundamental rights which guarantee EU citizens opportunity to 
pursue economic activity free from interference of public intervention. In the 
words of Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann: fundamental freedoms are the sources of 
legitimation of market integration, non-discriminatory competition, in that 
they increase individual autonomy, equality and responsibility, control abu-
ses of government and maximize economic welfare17. 
Maduro denies any real basis for ordoliberal reading of the European Eco-
nomic Constitution and argues for its open character. This open character of 
Economic Constitution emerges from the need to balance between various 
confl icting interests intrinsic to the process of market integration. Open chara-
cter is presupposed to exist within the framework of general economic liberal 
idea and comparative advantage.
Absence of purely and exclusively ordoliberal, or neoliberal for that matter, re-
ading of the Treaty provisions on free movement of goods is a conclusion that 
can hardly be rejected. European regulatory market policy can certainly be des-
cribed as fl oating between heuristic models excellently developed by Maduro. 
However, there is a twist that separates fi ndings of this paper from Maduro’s 
original conclusions. Open character of the European Economic Constitution 
requires critical review in light of recent changes to the primary EU law. 
Changes in primary EU Law introduced by the entry into legal force of the 
Lisbon Treaty on December 1st 2009 are telling somewhat different narrati-
ve than fully open nature of European Economic Constitution. Article 3 of 
the TEU requires that EU establish its Internal Market as highly competitive 
social market economy. Social market economy is a concept of undeniably 
German origin (Soziale Marktwirtschaft)18 that evolved from ordoliberalism. 
17  Petersmann, E-U, Proposals for a new constitution for the European Union: Build-
ing-blocks for a constitutional theory and constitutional law of the EU, 32 Common Market 
Law Review, Issue 5, 1995 p. 1154
18  The term Soziale Marktwirtschaft was probably fi rst used by its main theoretical propo-
nent, economist Alfred Müller-Armack, in his article Wirtschaftslenkung und Marktwirtschaft 
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It keeps original ordoliberal emphasize on rule of law and competition rules. It 
also interprets market freedoms as fundamental rights but allows for more ba-
lancing with wider societal interests. However, this balancing (between market 
and wider societal interests) in social market economy should be exercised 
by neutral public authority in non-discriminatory and proportional manner. 
Sounds familiar? Social market economy became dominate at home in West 
Germany and is often accredited for impressive post-war economic recovery 
(Wirtschaftswunder). Maduro’s claim that there is no correspondence between 
ordoliberal economic constitutional concepts and the constitutional traditi-
ons of Member States(...) Nor are such concepts refl ected in the text, or even 
the genesis, of the EC Treaty19 in the light of the existence the new aim of the 
Treaty - social market economy (and its clear German origin) can therefore be 
rejected. 
How can the European Economic Constitution be still open in character 
when Lisbon Treaty stipulates social market economy as aim of EU Internal 
Market? Previous versions of the Treaties lacked any mention of social mar-
ket economy. Treaty of Nice used the concept of open market economy with 
free competition (Art 4 of TEC). Normative shift from open market eco-
nomy to social market economy in EU primary law is clearly visible when 
describing character of the Economic Constitution. This does not represent 
radical change in substance of the European Economic Constitution. Social 
market economy itself is a heteronymous concept. Such normative change 
represents evolution because it merely narrows wide scope of regulatory cho-
ices. European Economic Constitution did not become purely ordoliberal 
but it became more ordoliberal in comparison to previous normative teleos. 
This reading also follows from the principle of sincere cooperation: Mem-
ber States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives (Art 4 TEU). Since entry into legal force of the Lisbon Treaty, let 
us conclude, European Economic Constitution became more closed in cha-
racter. In the future it will be implemented within the broader framework of 
social market economy. 
(Müller-Armack , A, Wirtschaftslenkung und Marktwirtschaft, Verlag für Wirtschaft und So-
zialpolitik Hamburg, 1947, p 88). On possibility that Ludwig W. Erhard coined the term (or that 
more person came to used independently) see more in Glossner L, Christian; Gregosz, David 
(eds.), 60 years of social market economy- Formation, Development and Perspectives of a 
Peacemaking Formula, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V , 2010.
19 Supra note 10, pp. 159
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3. DIRECT HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF ARTICLE 34. TFEU: CASE 
LAW ANALYSIS 
Opposite to what could be derived from the introduction of this paper CJEU case 
law on the direct horizontal application of Article 34 is not perfectly clear. Case 
law that rejects direct horizontal effect is, naturally, dominant. Case often cited 
by legal commentators20 confi rming absence of horizontal direct effect is Sapod 
Audic judgment from 2002. The Court interpreted that a contractual provision 
cannot be regarded as a barrier to trade for the purposes of Article 34 since it 
was not imposed by a Member State but agreed between individuals21. However, 
there are cases that could potentially be seen as challenging traditional conclusi-
on of non-existence of direct horizontal effect. We could classify these cases into 
three following categories: early IP (intellectual property) cases,  cases applying 
direct horizontal effect as supposed legal reality (very rear) and ‘shades of grey’ 
cases in which horizontal/vertical distinction is blurred by different modes of 
delegation of public authority to private entities. 
Early IP cases, starting from the 1971 and judgement in Deutsche Grammop-
hon22 case, introduced clear line of jurisprudence by virtue of which exercise 
of IP rights by their private holders could be subject of judicial review under 
the present Article 34. This line of jurisprudence borrowed from the case law 
on competition rules (in the matter of separating competition and IP law) when 
differentiating between exercise and existence of IP rights.  Meer existence 
of IP right was not suffi cient to evoke horizontal application of Article 34. 
However, exercise of these rights by their private holders in situations with 
cross-border effect was suffi cient for a judicial review under the Article 34. In 
Terrapin23 and Centrafarm v. American Home Products24 the Court of Justice 
developed particular criteria for judicial review of IP rights under Article 34. 
Out of the scope of Treaty prohibition contained in Article 34 were measures 
(exercise of IP rights) not discriminatory in nature and deprived of intention of 
market partition (subjective element). However limited25, this line of jurispru-
20 See for example: Krenn, C, A Missing Piece in the Horizontal Effect “Jigsaw”: Horizontal 
Direct Effect and the Free Movement of Goods, Common Market Law Review, Vol 49, pp 177-
215, 2012 and Löwisch, S, Die horizontale Direktwirkung der Europäischen Grundfreiheiten, 
Nomos, 2009.
21  Case C-159/00 Sapod Audic, EU:C:2002:343, para 74
22  Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon, EU:C:1971:59 
23  Case 119/75 Terrapin, EU:C:1976:94 
24  Case 3/78 Centrafarm v. American Home Products, EU:C:1978:174 
25  Aplicabble in specifi c situations when IP rights of private holders impede free movement 
of goods.
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dence that could potentially be seen as recognizing direct horizontal effect of 
Article 34 has been abandoned by the subsequent case law development. By 
the end of 1980’s the Court of Justice did not use demarcation between exerci-
se and existence of IP rights anymore. Scope of judicial review in this matter 
has been limited only to IP legislation of Member States.  Exercise of IP rights 
by their private holders could only be scrutinised via compatibility of national 
legislation with free movement of goods. 
Cases applying direct horizontal effect of Article 34 as supposed legal reality 
are very rear occurrence indeed. The ultimate example for this category of ca-
ses is 1981 judgment of the Court in the Dansk Supermarked26 case. The case 
was about group of private Danish hardware merchants called Imerco. Imerco 
commissioned in UK a china service with pictures of Danish royal castles and 
group markings on the occasion of their anniversary. The sale of that service 
was reserved exclusively to members of Imerco group. However, it was agreed 
between them and the British manufacturer that the substandard pieces might 
be marketed by the manufacturer in the UK but might not in any circumstan-
ces be exported to Denmark (or to other Scandinavian countries).  Dansk Su-
permarked, a company that does not hold any affi liations with Imerco group, 
has been able to obtain through its dealers a number of china services which 
marketed in the UK and offer them at prices considerably lower than those 
sold by Imerco’s members.  Upon a law suit from Imerco group Dansk Su-
permarked has been found in breach of Danish Marketing Law. Supermarked 
claimed that this Danish decision amounts to measure having equivalent effect 
to quantitative restriction of imports. The Court of Justice in his judgement 
applied principle of mutual recognition27. Obvious problem with this case is 
lingering question of direct horizontal effect. Strikingly, the Court very expli-
citly states: 
It must furthermore be remarked that it is impossible in any circumstances for 
agreements between individuals to derogate from the mandatory provisions 
of the Treaty on the free movement of goods28[!].
When Dansk Supermarked case was decided in the beginning of the eighties 
it could seam, especial in the aftermath of the Walrave and Koch29 judgment 
(from the fi eld of freedom to provide services), that outright introduction of 
26  Case 58/80 Dansk Supermarked A/S v A/S Imerco,  EU:C:1981:17 
27  Ibid, para 18: importation into a Member State of goods lawfully marketed in another 
Member State cannot as such be classifi ed as an improper or unfair commercial practice.
28  Ibid, para 17
29  Case 36/74 B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie et Federación Española Ciclismo, EU:C:1974:140
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horizontal direct effect of the Treaty provisions on free movement of goods 
is eminent. However, this did not happen. The subsequent case-law remained 
more or less persistent in the denial of horizontal direct effect. In retrospective 
it is quite possible that the Court in the period from the beginning of 1970’s to 
the end of 1980’s had been open to the possibility of horizontal direct effect. 
Case law analysis certainly point towards that conclusion.  Pressure generated 
by increasing case-load in the fi eld of free movement of goods after Cassis 
de Dijon30 judgment in 1979 combined with impetus for market integration 
from the legislative process after the adoption of Single European Act in 1986 
closed this openness on the side of the Court.  Keck31 judgment which substan-
tially reduced the regulatory scope of Article 34 in 1993 confi rms this line of 
reasoning. 
Third categories are ‘shades of grey’ cases in which distinction between ho-
rizontal and vertical is blurred by different modes of delegation of public au-
thority to private entities. These cases are probably most interesting from the 
standpoint of direct horizontal effect due to the two reasons. Firstly, they are 
simply actually and potentially most numerous. Secondly, they potential allow 
for wide scope of regulatory choices between outright recognition or denial of 
horizontal direct effect of Article 34. The Court of Justice has, in number of 
occasions32, demonstrated that it prefers to leave itself a widest possible range 
of regulatory choices in case-law development. Therefore “shades of grey” 
category would be most suitable area for any hypothetical shift in the question 
of direct horizontal effect of Treaty provisions on free movement of goods. 
Most recent (and quite popular in legal scholarship33) case that can be classi-
fi ed into ‘shades of grey’ category is the judgment of the Court from 2012 in 
Fra.bo34.  The case revolves around German private professional non-profi t 
association DVGW. DVGW, among its many activities issues various techni-
cal certifi cates to private undertakings. Fra.bo, Italian manufacturer of copper 
30  Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, EU:C:1979:42
31  Joined cases C-267 i 268/91 Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mi-
thouard, EU:C:1993:905 
32  Most obvious example of such regulatory approach is  judge – made Dassonville formula 
defi ning what constitutes a measure having equivalent effect  (all trading rules enacted by 
Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, 
intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quan-
titative restrictions).    
33  Van Harten, H; Towards horizontal direct effect for the free movement of goods? Com-
ment on Fra.bo, European Law Review, 38(5), 2013, 677-694.
34  Case C-171/11 Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV 
(DVGW) - Technisch-Wissenschaftlicher Verein, EU:C:2012:453  
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fi ttings was denied certifi cate for its copper fi ttings on the grounds it did not 
meet the requirements of a new endurance test organised by the DVGW. Fra.
bo brought an action against the DVGW before the Landgericht Köln arguing 
that the cancellation and/or the refusal to extend the certifi cate are contrary to 
EU Law. In Fra.bo’s view, the DVGW is bound by the provisions governing the 
free movement of goods. As a private-law association, the DVGW considered 
that it is not bound by Treaty provisions on free movement of goods and that 
only Germany is required to answer for any infringements of EU Law. Howe-
ver, the whole case was determined by the Court upon the fact that German 
public procurement legislation gave special status to DVGW certifi cates. The-
refore, the Court interpreted:  
...it is clear that a body such as the DVGW, by virtue of its authority to certify 
the products, in reality holds the power to regulate the entry into the German 
market of products such as the copper fi ttings at issue in the main proceedings 
Accordingly, the answer to the fi rst question is that Article 28 EC [Article 34 
TFEU] must be interpreted as meaning that it applies to standardisation and 
certifi cation activities of a private-law body, where the national legislation 
considers the products certifi ed by that body to be compliant with national 
law and that has the effect of restricting the marketing of products which are 
not certifi ed by that body 35.
Seemingly Fra.bo turned to be just a case of delegation of powers by the Mem-
ber Sate to a private organisation. However, one interesting circumstance re-
mains: Fra.bo copper fi ttings were certifi ed in Italy. The underlying issue of 
mutual recognition was not tackled by the judgement. Furthermore, in Fra.bo 
the Court of Justice confi rmed that is willing to scrutinise measures of private 
entities according to the criteria of market access (e.g. power to entry into 
specifi c market) under Article 34. Emphasize seems to be more on substantive 
power to regulate market and less on delegating acts of public power. Advocate 
General Trstenjak in her Opinion suggested the applicability of the principle 
of the free movement of goods to a private-law association with de facto ru-
le-making competence36. Such substantive criteria can be viewed as opening 
the door for application of Article 34 in situations when private entities are 
in reality holding the position of market regulator even without any specifi c 
act of delegation by Member Sate (which was not the case in Fra.bo). Let us 
imagine situation where DVGW certifi cates are not empowered by the national 
(public procurement or other) legislation but are generally recognized by the 
35  Ibid, para 31-32.
36  Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Case C-171/11, Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Ver-
einigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) - Technisch-Wissenschaftlicher Verein, 
EU:C:2012:453,  para 45
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national business community. Thus, in this hypothetical situation, certifi cation 
activity would also constitute a substantive barrier to entry (or to stay) in the 
market. What would the Court decide then? If hypothetical judicial decision in 
that situation would remain the same as in the real Fra.bo case it would mean 
recognition of horizontal direct effect of Article 34 to, at least, private entities 
that engage in standardisation and certifi cation activities. 
4.  LEGAL REASONING AND DIRECT HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF 
FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS RULES
There are many proponents of recognition of direct horizontal effect of free 
movement of goods rules in legal scholarship. We would not even try to name 
or number them all. Instead, this paper will try to summarise main arguments 
for direct horizontal effect and then proceed to generating some new ones in 
relation with the reshaping of European Economic Constitution and entry into 
legal force of the Lisbon Treaty. Before embarking into affi rmative argumen-
tation we should note that there are also numerous legal arguments against 
recognition of direct horizontal effect. 
Substantive negative argument is that there is simply no need for it. This view 
naturally views freedom of movement of goods as merely freedom from State 
intervention and not as a constitutional fundamental freedom with full direct 
effect. As we have seen earlier, the Court of Justice is also37 dominantly lining 
to such line of reasoning when it comes to free movement of goods rules (whi-
ch is not the case in other market freedoms). According to this view addressee 
of Article 34 and 35 are Member States and not individuals. The wording of 
Article 34 and 35 is neutral. Thus, fundamental question behind this dilemma 
is really a nature of Economic Constitution embedded in the norm.  Obstacles 
to free movement of goods can be generated by private entities (statement akin 
to common knowledge). Attributing direct effect only to State actions, without 
any substantive explanation of reasons for doing so in case law, could be seen 
as deprived of substance and formalistic. Especially because the existence of 
possibility that private entities generate obstacles to free movement was used 
as argumentation for recognizing direct horizontal effect in other market free-
doms. Another traditional negative argument is, of course, interference with 
competition rules. That argument is, in general, rejected in the case law. In 
judgment in joined cases DiP Sp.A38 the Court of Justice cumulative applied 
competition rules (on state aid) with Treaty provisions on free movement of 
37  Supra 3. Direct horizontal effect of Article 34. TFEU: case law analysis.
38  Joined Cases C-140 & 142/94, DiP Sp.A, EU:C:1995:330 
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goods. Possibility of cumulative application of free movement rules with com-
petition rules has also been accepted in the other market freedom by the case 
law development. 
First affi rmative argument is coherence of the EU Internal Market Law. There 
can be hardly any doubt about existence of convergence between market free-
doms39. In Walrave and Koch judgment Court recognized direct horizontal 
effect of Treaty provisions on freedom to provide services and in Angonese40 
case it confi rmed direct horizontal effect of Treaty provision on free move-
ment of workers. Furthermore, some commentators, like Schepel41, believe 
that is only a matter of time for Court to establish the horizontal direct effe-
ct of Article 63 TFEU (free movement of capital). Naturally, convergence of 
market freedoms is not, and shall never be, absolute because of the intrinsic 
differences between market freedoms. Goods are not humans et vice versa, to 
put it simply. However, according to this line of argumentation, similarities 
in regulatory choices made in EU Internal Market Law serve the purpose of 
establishing and maintaining Internal Market (that should be exercised, let us 
not forget, within the concept of social market economy). 
Catherine Barnard developed idea of so called ‘extended vertical direct effe-
ct’42. This idea basically points that horizontal direct effect is only to be esta-
blished when private subjects assert the regulatory powers of the Member Sta-
te. These powers are not necessarily transferred to them. Private individuals 
can also undertake metamorphosis into quasi-state behaviour. Most obvious 
examples are processional sport organizations (e.g. FIFA). This is different of 
simply delegation powers to private subjects. Schepel in his paper on horizon-
tal application of free movement rules43 rejects idea of ‘extended vertical direct 
effect’. Such general explanation, as Scehpel interprets, is denied by the Court 
inter alia in the important Viking judgment:  it does not follow from the ca-
se-law (…) that that interpretation applies only to quasi-public organisations 
or to associations exercising a regulatory task and having quasi-legislative 
39  Krenn, C, A Missing Piece in the Horizontal Effect “Jigsaw”: Horizontal Direct Effect 
and the Free Movement of Goods, Common Market Law Review, Vol 49, p 183 and Maduro, 
L.M.P., We the Court - The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitu-
tion, Oxford Hart Publishing, 1998, pp. 101
40  Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA EU:C:2000:296
41  Schepel, H,  Constitutionalising the Market,Marketising the Constitution, and to Tell 
the Difference: On the Horizontal Application of the Free Movement Provisions in EU Law, 
European Law Journal, 18, 2, 2012,  177–200.
42 Barnard, C, The Substantive Law of the EU - the four freedoms, Oxford University Press, 
2004, pp. 262
43 Supra note 38 
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powers44.  However, possible rejection of this idea in one set of free movement 
rules (or in general for that matter) does not necessary means rejection in other 
set of rules – free movement of goods in particular. Obviously, then coherence 
between market freedoms becomes secondary. Professional sport organizati-
ons mainly  self-regulate in the fi eld of free movement of workers and services 
but professional standardisation private organizations (such as DVGW) ma-
inly regulate in the fi eld of free movement of goods.  If one accept ‘shades of 
grey’ category of cases as most likely candidates for horizontal direct effect 
of Article 34, which is proposed earlier in  this paper, than  idea of ‘extended 
vertical direct effect’ can fi t  perfectly into the picture of hypothetical future 
recognition.
Second argument is effet utile application of Article 34.  Krenn in his paper on 
the topic adapts logical four step interpretation original made by Körber45 in 
other market freedoms that excellently summarise this line of argumentation: 
i. The wording of Article 34 TFEU is neutral, so as to make it in principle 
possible to include private parties among its addressees.
ii. The internal market comprises an area without internal frontiers where 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured. The 
free movement of goods serves the objective of an internal  market by en-
suring free movement.
iii. Not only States but also private parties can compromise this objective.
iv. From this follows that Article 34 TFEU must apply to the conduct of pri-
vate actors.46
Krenn (basically) accepts effet utile argumentation and proposes de minimis 
threshold for the direct horizontal application of Article 34. Krenn’s de mnimis 
threshold represents adoption of market access criteria. Horizontal applicabi-
lity, according to Krenn’s proposal, would exist in situations when behaviour 
of private entities impedes access of product to market (he is citing judgment 
in Commission v. Italy47).  Interestingly, the same legal reasoning is deployed, 
as we have seen, by the Court of Justice in Fra.bo case. Of course, important 
addition is that in Fra.bo judgement the Court, apart from deploying market 
access criteria, scrutinised behaviour of private entity in relation to delegation 
of public powers. 
44 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union 
v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti  EU:C:2007:772, para 64.
45  Körber, T,  Grundfreiheiten und Privatrecht, Mohr Siebeck, 2004, pp. 776.
46  Supra note 20, Krenn,  pp. 199
47  Case C-110/05, Commission v. Italy, EU:C:2009:66
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Third argument is the necessity to correlate free movement rules with other 
Treaty provisions, mainly general principles and fundamental rights. This has 
been done in judicial application of other market freedoms. General prohi-
bition of discrimination on grounds of nationality (now contained in Artic-
le 18 TFEU), which is directly horizontally applicable, is the most obvious 
link. Striking example of such legal reasoning in the area of free movement 
of workers can be found in Angonese and Raccaneli48 judgements. In both 
of this cases general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
served as a building block for establishing direct horizontal effect on Treaty 
provisions on free movement of workers (present Article 45 TFEU). General 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality in the free movement 
of workers covers indirect discrimination. Thus, analogous application of this 
principle with horizontal application of Article 34 would constitute signifi cant 
substantive expansion of regulatory scope.  Furthermore, such argumentation 
can be used to equalise market freedom with fundamental rights. This was 
what Court has done in Bosman49 when free movement of workers has been 
interpreted cumulatively as a market freedom and fundamental right from the 
aspect of right to a free access to employment. Very ordoliberal indeed. Pro-
posal of Derrick Waytt on direct horizontal application of free movement ru-
les in situations when private entities engage in discriminatory steps outside 
normal market behaviour50 is within this line of argumentation, albeit more 
moderate in scope.  Of course, correlation of free movement of goods rules 
with general principles and fundamental rights is ‘a whole different ball game’ 
in comparison to the pervious affi rmative arguments. Nevertheless, it can be a 
way of  attributing horizontal direct effect to Articles 34 and 35. That line of 
argumentation, although it may seem tempting, is not derived of risks for regu-
latory policy. Danger of such correlation for judicial regulatory policy is that it 
represents a slippery slope. Once when general principle or fundamental right 
is linked with free movement provisions denying full blown direct horizontal 
effect becomes very hard task. Therefore, idea of ‘extended vertical effect’ in 
‘shades of grey’ category of cases seems as more likely candidate, at least in 
the opening phase,  for attributing horizontal direct effect to free movement of 
goods Treaty provisions. 
48  Case C-94/07, Raccanelli, EU:C:2008:425, para 45
49  Case C-415/93, Bosman, EU:C:1995:463, para 129
50  Waytt, D, Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Freedoms and the Right to Equality after 
Viking and Mangold, and the Implications for Community Competence, Croatian Yearbook of 
European Law & Policy, Vol. 4, 2008 and Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 20/2008. 
Waytt considers that purchasing choices, even if discriminatory, should fall out of the scope of 
direct horizontal applicability (since they constitute normal market behaviour). 
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5. CONCLUSION
Lisbon Treaty stipulates social market economy as objective of EU Internal 
market.  Normative shift from open market economy to social market economy 
in EU primary law (from Nice to Lisabon) dictates substantive shift in reading 
of European Economic Constitution.  Normative shift could not happen witho-
ut majoritanian consensus at EU level. Although there are differences between 
original ordoliberalism and concept of social market economy correlation is 
undeniable. Thus, normative conclusion is that reading of EU Internal Market 
Law is required to become more ordoliberal than before December 1st 2009. 
Market integration process still encompasses different intrinsic tensions and 
competing heuristic models (excellently described by Maduro). The European 
Economic Constitution did not become exclusively ordoliberal but it became 
more ordoliberal in comparison to previous normative teleos. We did not see 
yet any real changes in market regulatory policy that would follow from this 
formal normative shift.  
Dilemma of horizontal direct effect of market freedoms is one of the most 
suitable areas for manifesting shifts in nature of European Economic Con-
stitution. This is because the rules on free movement are source of consti-
tutional legitimacy. In orodliberalism market principles are the source of 
legitimacy for regulatory intervention in market.  Viewing market freedoms 
of EU Law as fundamental freedoms follows that ordoliberal interpretation. 
This is exactly what the European Court of Justice has done in the fi eld of 
free movement of workers, freedom to provide services and right of establi-
shment (and failed to do in the fi eld of free movement of goods and capital). 
Advocate General Maduro in his Opinion in the Viking case has unwittingly 
summarised orodliberal reading of market freedoms in respect to the issue 
of horizontal direct effect: 
The rules on freedom of movement and the rules on competition achieve this 
purpose principally by granting rights to market participants. Essentially, 
they protect market participants by empowering them to challenge certain 
impediments to the opportunity to compete on equal terms in the common 
market. The existence of that opportunity is the crucial element in the pursuit 
of allocative effi ciency in the Community as a whole. Without the rules on 
freedom of movement and competition, it would be impossible to achieve the 
Community’s fundamental aim of having a functioning common market.
(...)
On the contrary, such horizontal effect would follow logically from the Treaty 
where it would be necessary in order to enable market participants throug-
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hout the Community to have equal opportunities to gain access to any part of 
the common market51.
Direct horizontal effect of Treaty provisions on free movement of goods, 
mainly of Article 34 TFEU, has been a subject of a much academic debate. 
Despite explicit and dominant rejection of direct horizontal effect of Article 
34 in the case-law (one of the most recent examples is Sapod Audic jude-
gment) there have been, from time to time, cases that could suggest different 
narrative.  This paper  classify such cases into three  categories: early IP ca-
ses,   cases applying direct horizontal effect as supposed legal reality (Dansk 
Supermarked judgement being probably most striking example) and ‘shades 
of grey’ cases in which horizontal/vertical distinction is blurred. Case law 
evolution in each of these categories can potentially go back and generate 
interpretative shifts in the doctrine (enough room to go back to the future). 
‘Shades of grey’ category of cases is detected to be a most suitable candida-
te for the shift in the doctrine of direct horizontal effect of free movement 
of goods rules. ‘Shades of grey’ category potential allow for wide scope of 
regulatory choices between outright recognition or denial of horizontal di-
rect effect of Article 34.  Most recent case from this category is judgment in 
Fra.bo that turned to be specifi c situation of delegation of powers. However, 
power of private entity to regulate market was emphasized in the judgement. 
Another basis of recognizing direct horizontal effect of free movement rules 
could be their correlation with general principles and fundamental rights. 
Especially with horizontally applicable general prohibition on grounds of 
nationality. However, such method represent a slippery slope because once 
when general principle is linked with free movement provisions denying full 
blown direct horizontal effect becomes very hard task.
‘Shades of grey’ category of cases encompasses situations when private enti-
ties undertake metamorphosis into quasi-state behaviour. Public powers are 
not necessarily transferred to them, they simply generate self-regulation. Such 
private regulation can of course create obstacles to free movement of goods. 
Particularly interesting is private regulation that can impede access of produ-
cts to markets (as in Fra.bo, with important addition of Member State sanctio-
ning this impediment). Catherine Barnard developed idea of ‘extended vertical 
direct effect’. This concept when applied to aforementioned situations (‘shades 
of grey’ category deprived of delegating acts) would amount to recognition of 
horizontal direct effect of free movement of goods. Such recognition would be 
limited in regulatory scope by market access criteria and address only private 
51  Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in the Case C-438/05 International Transport 
Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line 
Eesti, , EU:C:2007:772, para 33 and 35.
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entities that engage in self-regulation. This could be a good starting point for 
reshaping of European Economic Constitution.     
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